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This paper introduces preliminary evidence from a cross-country database of 
policy characteristics and potential uses of that database.  While most databases 
have emphasized either the content of policies (e.g., size of government deficits) 
or countries’ formal institutions (e.g., political regime, electoral system), the 
variables in this database reflect the policymaking capabilities of different 
polities.  The paper attempts to explain these policy characteristics as depending 
on the workings of political institutions, using a logic emphasizing intertemporal 
political compromise.  The paper also contrasts this logic with alternatives such as 
the veto players approach.  The paper concludes by suggesting the use of these 
policy characteristics or state capabilities as explanatory variables for the 
effectiveness of public spending in various social areas. 
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  31. Introduction 
 
In every state, big or small, new or old, public policies play a fundamental role in virtually all 
domains of development. The great surge of studies delving into this relationship in the context 
of growth has for several decades paid particular attention to the specific content of those 
policies. Countless overarching prescriptions were generated and also modified over the years 
according to the conventional wisdom of the time. Motivated in part by disappointing results, the 
appeal of such one-size-fits-all recommendations has lost considerable ground to concerns about 
states’ ability to formulate and carry out policies. To date, many such “state capabilities” have 
been identified as key factors in explaining the impact of policies on desired outcomes. In a 
landmark study, Weaver and Rockman (1993) argue that governmental effectiveness can be 
measured according to several standards; the one they propose focuses on a set of tasks and on 
capabilities that governments need, regardless of their specific policy objectives, in order to 
perform those tasks (Weaver and Rockman, 1993: 6).  Capabilities are a pattern of government 
influence on its environment that produces substantially similar outcomes across time and policy 
areas.  Weaver and Rockman propose a number of government capabilities, including setting and 
maintaining priorities,  targeting resources,  innovating when old policies have failed, 
coordinating conflicting objectives,  ensuring effective implementation, and ensuring policy 
stability so that policies have time to work. 
From our applied experience with policies and policymaking in Latin America, we share 
the same substantive concerns.  Latin America has gone through successive policy paradigms in 
the belief that once the “right” policies are implemented, things will work well.  These waves 
have shifted from State-run, inward-looking development in the postwar era to the 
macroeconomic discipline and trade liberalization of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s.  
While the enthusiasm for the latter has waned, many observers and actors have started to search 
for (or to prematurely proclaim) a new paradigm. 
This paper is part of an agenda that departs from the usual concern about “the right 
policies” and indeed focuses on the processes that shape policies, carry them forward to 
implementation, and sustain or adapt them over time.  We believe that the process of 
policymaking has important implications in itself for the qualities of resulting policies and 
resulting welfare outcomes, independently of the specific content of the policies.  For that 
reason, in previous work we have attempted to build indicators of some policy characteristics, 
  4such as stability, adaptability, quality of implementation, coordination and the like, for a sample 
of Latin American countries.  This paper is a continuation of that effort, extending the empirical 
analysis originally focused in in-depth studies of Latin American cases, to the elaboration of a 
wider data set to explore these issues cross nationally. 
The paper begins, in the next section, by motivating, introducing, and describing a 
number of variables capturing various qualities of public policies across countries.  The rest of 
the paper presents different empirical applications utilizing these policy characteristics.  These 
applications reflect our current efforts to explain the determinants of policy capabilities across 
countries, and some initial utilization of these variables as explanatory factors in the 
effectiveness of spending in some specific policy areas.  The idea of the examples is not to 








Policies are complex undertakings. Taking any particular “policy reform” to fruition is a process 
that involves multiple actors through many stages of the policy process. It requires specific 
responses from economic and social agents, and therefore necessitates several forms of 
cooperation and beliefs about the durability and other properties of the policy.  Thus in most 
instances, it takes more than a set of favorable initial conditions in order for policies to produce 
effective results. Governments need the capacity to maintain momentum throughout the whole 
process.  
Some economists’ beliefs notwithstanding, a universal set of “right” policies does not 
necessarily exist.  Policies are contingent responses to underlying states of the world.  What 
might work at one point in time in a given country might not work in a different place or in the 
same place at another time.  In some cases, some particular characteristics of policies or the 
details of their implementation might matter as much as the broad type of policy. For instance, 
Dani Rodrik analyzed six countries that implemented a set of policies that shared the same 
generic title—“export subsidization”—but had widely different degrees of success.
2  Rodrik 
                                                 
2 Rodrik (1995).  
  5relates their success to such features as the consistency with which the policy was implemented, 
which office was in charge, how the policy was bundled (or not) with other policy objectives, 
and how predictable the future of the policy was.   
The literature on economic growth offers many such examples. Just to cite a few, 
scholars in this area of study have investigated the effect of credibility and flexibility on policy 
success. The former has been widely recognized in recent work on macroeconomics, trade 
policy, regulation, and other areas of economics.
3  The effects of policies on the final economic 
and social outcomes of interest depends on the actions and reactions of economic and social 
agents, who take into account their expectations about the future of the policies in question 
before deciding their responses.  As Rodrik explains, in reference to trade reform, “it is not trade 
liberalization per se, but credible trade liberalization that is the source of efficiency benefits.  
The predictability of the incentives created by a trade regime, or lack thereof, is generally of 
much greater importance than the structure of these incentives.  In other words, a distorted, but 
stable set of incentives does much less damage to economic performance than an uncertain and 
unstable set of incentives generated by a process of trade reform lacking credibility.”
4 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2008) take this argument further by adding to the role of 
credibility that of policy flexibility in explaining growth: “Credible commitment to acknowledge 
private property rights, whether in the interests of the elite or the majority of the population, is 
the classic example of the value of certainty about policy action. More generally, however, 
allowing some flexibility in institutions, such that they can be altered to allow private or public 
agents to take fuller advantage of new opportunities that arise as technology or the environment 
changes, would be expected to foster improved economic performance and more rapid growth.”
5  
These are just a couple of examples motivating this project’s efforts to build measures of 
certain characteristics or key features of public policy that may affect the countries ability to 
reach their development objectives, beyond their specific content (e.g., whether some particular 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Barro and Gordon (1983); Calvo (1996, Section V); Drazen (2000, Section II); Levy and Spiller 
(1994); and Rodrik (1989). 
4 Rodrik  (1989, p. 2). For models formalizing the effects of policies of uncertain duration in several economic 
contexts, see Calvo (1996, Section V) and Calvo and Drazen (1998). 
5 Italics added for emphasis 
  6taxes are high or low).
6  Based on our previous work, we have selected the following six 
characteristics as the leading indicators of a country’s policy characteristics: 
 
•  Stability: The extent to which policies are stable over time;  
•  Adaptability:  The extent to which they can be adjusted when they fail or when 
circumstances change;   
•  Coherence and coordination: The degree to which polices are consistent with related 
policies and result from well-coordinated actions among the actors who participate in 
their design and implementation; 
•  The quality of implementation and enforcement: The degree to which policies are 
enforced or not. 
•  Public regardedness: The degree to which policies pursue the public interest;  
•  Efficiency: The extent to which they reflect an allocation of scarce resources that 
ensures high returns.  
 
In assembling these measures of policy characteristics, we have proceeded in two stages.  
In a first stage we focused on a number of in-depth studies across various Latin American 
countries. This effort involved: 
 
•  Policy case studies including tax policy, utilities privatization and regulation, 
education, decentralization, and civil sector reform. Several of these studies, 
undertaken by a number of sector specialists under a common analytical framework 
are summarized in IDB (2006). 
•  Studies of the overall process of policymaking in a number of Latin American 
countries, reflected in Stein et al. (2008). 
•  A “State Capabilities” Survey undertaken by the Inter-American Development Bank, 
which questioned more than 150 experts in 18 Latin American countries, regarding 
the capabilities of the State identified as crucial in the seminal work of Weaver and 
Rockman (1993).  Even though these capabilities (See Appendix A) tie in closely 
with the features of public policies we wanted to study, the State Capabilities Survey 
                                                 
6 We have also been influenced by several strands of literature in political science, particularly the strand related to 
veto players analysis, which stresses the relevance of stability (Tsebelis 2002), decisiveness and resoluteness, and 
public regardedness (Cox and McCubbins 2001), and the strand on state capabilities (Weaver and Rockman 1993).  
  7included a number of additional questions directly geared to uncover these policy 
characteristics. 
 
This combination of quantitative and qualitative information was explored and contrasted 
in a number of ways, and it gave a pretty coherent picture across Latin American countries.  IDB 
(2006) and Stein and Tommasi (2007) present an attempt to relate these policy characteristics to 
some aspects of political institutions in the Latin American countries. 
This paper reflects the second stage of this research program, in which we attempt to 
build broader cross-country indicators of policy capabilities, drawing from available broad cross-
national sources, building on the insights gained in the deeper study of the Latin American cases.  
The correlations of the international variables we construct here and those constructed for the  
Latin American sample are very high (Berkman et al., 2008).  
 
 
2.2. The Variables: Definition and Construction 
 
2.2.1 Policy Stability 
 
Some countries seem capable of sustaining most policies over time. In other countries, policies 
are frequently reversed, often at each minor change of political winds (whether a change in 
administration or a change in some key cabinet member or senior bureaucrat). Having stable 
policies does not mean that policies cannot change at all, but rather that changes tend to respond 
to changing economic conditions or to failure of previous policies, rather than to political 
changes. In countries with stable policies, changes tend to be incremental, building upon 
achievements of previous administrations, and tend to be achieved through consensus. In 
contrast, volatile policy environments are characterized by large swings and by lack of 
consultation with different groups in society. 
 To gauge policy stability we used four variables from three different sources. The first is 
the standard deviation of the detrended (using a quadratic trend) Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom for the years 1999 to 2004. Two of the variables come from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) of 2002. One measures whether legal or political changes over 
the past five years have undermined respondent’s firm’s planning capacity, and the other   
measures whether new governments honor the contractual commitments and obligations of their 
  8predecessors. Finally we used a question from Profils Institutionnels (PI) where experts evaluate 
the “Consistency and continuity of government action in economic matters.” 
 
2.2.2 Policy Adaptability  
 
It is desirable for countries to be able to adapt policies to changing economic conditions and to 
change policies when they are clearly failing. Policy adaptability can be hindered either by a 
policy making process prone to gridlock, or to rigidities introduced explicitly to avoid 
opportunistic manipulation of policy.  In some cases, the configuration of the political system 
can often lead to gridlock, making it difficult to achieve change. In other cases, the government 
of the day might be prone to abuse discretion by adopting opportunistic one-side-policies. In 
order to limit that opportunism, such polities might resort to fixed policy rules that are difficult to 
change.
7 This, of course, limits policy volatility, but at the cost of reducing adaptability. In either 
case, low policy adaptability leads to the inability to respond to shocks adequately, and a 
propensity to keep sub-optimal policies for extended periods of time. 
Our measure of policy adaptability was constructed based on four variables from three 
different sources. Two variables come from the Columbia University State Capacity Survey 
(CUSCS). In the first question experts (from academia, government and media) rate the states 
ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems, and in the second they rate states’ 
ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives. A third variable is drawn from The 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) for 2006 measuring the degree of adaptability based on 
the ability of the political leadership to act flexibly, political leaders’ capability for learning, and 
whether political leaders can replace failing measures with innovative policy. Finally, we used 
the Profils Institutionnels item where experts evaluate the decision-making capacity of political 
authorities in economic matters (responsibility, rapidity, etc). 
 
2.2.3 Policy Coordination and Coherence 
 
Public policies are the outcome of actions taken by multiple actors in the policymaking process. 
Ideally, different agents acting in the same policy domain should coordinate their actions to 
produce coherent policies. However, this does not always occur. In some countries, 
policymaking on certain issues involves a large number of actors that do not communicate 
                                                 
7 This is sometimes accomplished by embedding policies such as pension benefits or intergovernmental transfers 
into the constitution. 
  9adequately with each other, leading to what Cox and McCubbins (2001) have called 
“balkanization” of public policies. Lack of coordination often reflects the non-cooperative nature 
of political interactions. It may occur among different agencies within the central government, 
between agencies in the central government and others at the regional or municipal level, or even 
among agents that operate in different stages of the policymaking process (such as when the 
complications that the bureaucracy might face during the implementation phase of a given policy 
are not taken into account during the design and approval stage of policymaking). 
Our measure of coordination and coherence was built based on two variables, one from the 
Columbia University State Capacity Survey and the other from the Profils Institutionnels 
database. The first is a rating of the effectiveness of coordination between the central 
government and local-level government organizations. The second rates co-ordination between 
ministries and within administrations.  
 
2.2.4 Policy Implementation and Enforcement 
 
A policy could be very well designed by the experts and pass through the appropriate legislative 
debate, and yet be completely ineffective if it is not well implemented and enforced. In many 
countries, the quality of policy implementation and enforcement is quite poor. This is associated 
in part with the lack of capable and independent bureaucracies, as well as the lack of strong 
judiciaries. To an important degree, the quality of policy implementation and enforcement in a 
given country will depend on the extent to which policymakers in that country have incentives 
and resources to invest in their policy capabilities.  
This index is based on the following six variables. Expert evaluation of whether the 
minimum wage set by law in the country is enforced, expert evaluation of whether tax evasion in 
the country is rampant or minimal, and expert evaluation of whether environmental regulation in 
the country is enforced, all from the GCR. We draw from the BTI analysts’ estimate of whether 
the government implements its reform policy effectively, and we draw from the CUSCS a rating 
of states’ ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives and a rating of states’ 
effectiveness in collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue. 
 
2.2.5 Policy Efficiency  
 
A key aspect of good policymaking is the ability of the state to allocate its scarce resources to 
those activities where they have the greatest returns. This feature of policies is somewhat related 
  10to public-regardedness since, to the extent that policymakers unduly favor specific sectors to the 
detriment of the public interest, they will be moving away from the most efficient allocation of 
resources. 
To capture efficiency we employed three measures. From the GCR we used the expert 
ratings of the composition of Public Spending and whether it is wasteful. From the BTI we 
employed experts’ evaluation of whether the government makes efficient use of available 
economic and human resources. Finally from the Economist Intelligence Unite (EIU) we use the 
experts’ assessment of the effectiveness of the political system in formulating and executing 
policy. 
2.2.6 Public-Regardedness of Policies 
 
Public-regardedness refers to the extent to which policies produced by a given system promote 
the general welfare and resemble public goods (that is, are public-regarding) or tend to funnel 
private benefits to certain individuals, factions, or regions in the form of projects with 
concentrated benefits, subsidies, or tax loopholes (that is, are private-regarding).
8 This dimension 
may exacerbate inequality, particularly since those favored by private-regarding policies tend to 
be the members of the elite, who have the economic and political clout to skew policy decisions 
in their favor.  
The public regardedness index is captured by three variables. The GCR’s expert rating of 
whether when deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials usually favor well-
connected firms and individuals or are neutral among firms and individuals. Also from GCR we 
use the experts’ evaluation of whether government social transfers go primarily to poor people or 
to the rich. Finally we include the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
(2005). 
 
2.2.7 The Policy Index   
 
The preceding section identified six key features of public policies: stability, adaptability, 
coordination and coherence, quality of implementation and enforcement, public-regardedness, 
and efficiency. While there may be other relevant characteristics of public policies that have not 
                                                 
8 This notion is taken from Cox and McCubbins (2001). 
  11been included in the analysis, in combination these features should provide a good picture of the 
quality of policymaking in many countries.  
The various indexes we have constructed to measure these key features could be 
combined in different ways to come up with an overall index of the quality of public policies. 
Because we don’t have a prior regarding which index should weight more, in constructing a 
policy index for this study we allocated the same weight to each of the key features discussed 
above and use the simple average of the different policy characteristics. Given that all the 
indexes tend to be highly correlated with each other, we feel confident that the approach will not 
affect the results significantly.     
 
3. Policy Characteristics across Countries 
 
All the variables we constructed are available in the accompanying dataset. A visual summary of 
these variables across countries is provided in the Appendix. Table 1 presents the partial 
correlations among the indexes. Even though most of the correlations are positive and highly 
significant, suggesting that to a great extent all good things tend to go together, various analyses 
described below and in the Appendix indicate that each of them measures a substantively 
different concept.
9 Running simple cluster analysis on the data yields interesting and expected 
associations.
10 On the one hand, stability, where countries get the higher scores, stands out from 
the other measures reflecting the common sense view that countries are more likely to suffer 
from rigidities in policy making rather than from excessive flexibility (Engerman and Sokoloff, 
2008). On the other, public-regardedness and efficiency seem to go hand in hand, again a fact 
that scholars and practitioners in the area of poverty alleviation tend to emphasize. Thus overall 
these results suggest that different policy dimensions are indeed being captured by the measures 
introduced here.  
 
                                                 
9 As explained in the Appendix we have taken great care in insuring that what we have is not just an 
optimism/pessimism bias driven by third factors.  One of the reasons for our confidence is that the different 
components of the indexes come from different sources and from different points in time. 
10 See the Appendix for a dendrogam of results. 
  12Table 1. Partial Correlations among the Indexes 
 
 




Stability  1.0000            
observations 121             
Adaptability  0.12 1.00           
observations 117  132           
Coordination  0.38** 0.42**  1.00         
observations 108  120  120         
Implement  0.08 0.74**  0.50** 1.0000       
observations 121  132  120  136       
Efficiency  0.21* 0.60**  0.40**  0.64**  1.00     
observations 120  131  119  135  136     
Public Reg  0.31** 0.45**  0.47**  0.66** 0.65**  1.00   
observations 116  127  1117  144  145  133   
Policy Index  0.46** 0.77**  0.69**  0.85** 0.79**  0.77**  1.00 
observations 121  132  120  136  136  133  138 
 
All correlations were calculated after controlling for GDP per capita, legal origin and region. 
** p<0.01  * p<0.05 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction the policy features measured in this study are usually 
associated with some aspects of development. Here we explore this connection in a broader 
sense by presenting some preliminary evidence showing the association that exists between our 
policy variables and two measures of economic development. We suggest (and briefly explore) 
more specific channels for that connection later in the paper. 
Table 2 shows basic and partial correlations (controlling for GDP per capita in 1990) 
between the six public policy variables and the policy index, with two measures of development. 
The first is the average GDP per capita growth, in U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity, 
between 1980 and 2005, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The second 
measure is the change in the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) between 1990 and 2005 
weighted by the available range for change.
11 The partial correlations are always positive and 
usually statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
11 The Human Development Index  is a bounded measure where the bounds are set based on the minimum and 
maximum values observed in the data. Thus the simple difference between initial and final years “punish” countries 
at the extreme ends of the distribution, especially the upper end, since it is harder to make any significant change if a 
country’s scores are already at the top. There is no easy way out of that problem. The measure employed here was 
created by dividing the change (measured between 1990 and 2005 to be consistent with the rest of the indexes) by 
the amount available to improve in the initial year (the scale ranges from 0 to 1). This rewards somewhat countries 
that have little room for improvement. 
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Table 2. Key Features of Public Policies and Economic Development: Partial Correlations
a 
 
  Adapt  Stability  Coordination 




Policy     
Index 
GDP per capita 
growth  0.36**  0.24**  0.28**  0.33**  0.24**  0.25**  0.37** 
Observations  131  121  119  135  135  132  137 
               
HDI (change)
b  0.24**  0.11  0.20*  0.16  0.18*  0.15  0.28** 
Observations  119  116  110  123  123  121  125 
 
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
a All results shown are after controlling for the log of GDP per capita in 1990, legal origin and region. 
b Results for the HDI measure also control for the Human Development Index value in 1990. 
 
Besides their association with indicators of interest to researchers, these policy variables 
can be a handy tool on their own right by allowing countries to be evaluated in comparative 
perspective. A first straightforward exercise in this direction is to consider country rankings. This 
can be a daunting task, however, with so many countries and dimensions, besides placing too 
much emphasis on the precision of the estimates. The approach taken in this section is to provide 
a summarized version of the ranking starting with a broader regional perspective. Clearly regions 
are one rough approximation of how countries are expected to perform. Thus the section ends by 
outlining some interesting deviations within regions and how countries tend to group across 
them. To provide the reader with a general overview, the Appendix contains a table with each 
country’s position based on quartile distributions of each policy variable. 
Beginning with regions, Figure 1 shows that the developed countries (including Western 
Europe, Japan, Australia, the United States, and Canada) rank the highest in terms of the policy 
index and are considerably higher on average than those of the rest of the world. The second 
highest ranking is that of the countries of East Asia and the Pacific, which includes the 
economically successful countries of Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and China.  Following third 
and fourth are those of the Middle East/North Africa and Eastern Europe/Central Asia, while 
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries fall to fifth on the scale.  The only regions 
surpassed by LAC are Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 
This pattern can be somewhat replicated when performing cluster analysis at the regional 
level and taking all policies into consideration (see the Appendix for results). Developed 
countries stand out, Middle-Eastern and East Asian countries group together and Latin America 
is closer to South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries.   






















This distribution varies little when we look at individual policy features. Developed 
countries lead on all fronts, followed by East Asia and the Pacific (except in Stability and Public 
Regardedness, where this group ranks third). Middle Eastern and North African countries rise to 
second place with regards to the degree to which their policies are public regarding. However, 
they place fifth in terms of both stability and adaptability of their policies. Latin America 
performs poorly in the efficiency and stability of its policies, coming last in both aspects. Its best 
ranking is achieved on policy adaptability, and even there it is still placed fourth. This evidence 
seems to suggest that even though all the variables tend to go together, the polities of some 
countries seem to be better able to deliver certain features of policies in detriment of others.  
Indeed, as shown in Table 3 while in some features countries of a given region tend to be 
close to each other, in others the variance is relatively large. To give some examples, developed 
countries tend to receive relatively high scores on stability. If we run cluster analysis on the data 
we find that they tend to form a somewhat uniform group that stands out from countries in other 
regions (the variance is 0.03). However, if we apply the same procedure to coordination the 
picture is quite different (variance is 0.48). Countries like Italy, Israel and France tend to be 
closer to success cases in the developing world (e.g. Botswana, Chile, Brazil, and Taiwan) rather 
  15than to the highest ranking developed countries (e.g. Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Norway). 
Conversely, Singapore tends to cluster together with successful developed countries, rather than 
with its East Asian fellows, in features such as coordination, public-regardedness, and 
implementation and enforcement.   
 
Table 3. Variance of Distances between Countries within Regions
12 
 
Region Adapt  Stability Coordination
Coherence 
Implement 




DEV 0.21  0.03  0.48  0.20  0.14 0.20 0.13 
EAP 0.40 0.10  0.51 0.32  0.63 0.48 0.27 
ECA 0.35  0.10  0.28  0.19  0.17 0.10 0.15 
LAC 0.29  0.17  0.32 0.26  0.33 0.25 0.23 
MNA 0.25  0.08  0.36  0.13  0.20 0.10 0.13 
SAS 0.14 0.07  0.16  0.10  0.05  0.11  0.05 
SSA 0.32 0.07  0.41  0.26  0.27 0.18 0.18 
 
 Again, these differences in clustering show that some countries seem to be better able to 
deliver certain features of policies to the detriment of others. For example, countries like Korea 
seem to have a high capacity to adapt their economic policies; however, they seem to be less able 
to do it in line with benefits for the overall population (public-regardedness). Comparatively, 
Finland seems to favor a wide range of the population with its policies; however, its capacity to 
adapt in the face of shocks seems to be relatively lower. 
In line with our findings from the initial data collected for Latin America, countries 
within the LAC region tend to group themselves as expected. High performers include Chile 
(reaching the top developed countries groups in almost all measures, except coordination), 
Uruguay (usually grouping with countries like Italy, Korea, Taiwan and South Africa), and 
Brazil  (again appearing closer to countries like Italy, France, Portugal and Taiwan). Haiti, 
Guatemala and Paraguay tend to appear at the bottom of the scale.  
One of the concerns usually expressed by researchers is that, despite the multitude of 
measures of policy and institutional capacity available, they are all getting at the same abstract 
                                                 
12 These variances are calculated based on the mean of Euclidean distances between each country of a given group 
and each of the other countries in that same group. The list of regional acronyms is the following: DEV: high-
income countries, EAP: East Asia and Pacific, ECA: Europe and Central Asia, LAC: Latin America and Caribbean, 
MNA: Middle East and North Africa, SAS: South Asia, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  16concept (Van de Walle, 2005; Knack and Manning, 2000). In this regard, the patterns discussed 
above seem to contribute to the face validity of the measures proposed here to the extent that 
interesting and reasonable variations are observed when comparing country rankings on the 
different dimensions.  
In the remainder of the paper we present a number of uses of these variables measuring 
policy characteristics.  In Section 4 we summarize and utilize an approach that emphasizes 
intertemporal cooperation in the policymaking process in order to link these policy 
characteristics to a number of features of the workings of political institutions.  Section 5 
contrasts the predictions of that intertemporal framework with those from the prominent veto 
players approach. Section 6 uses our indicator of policy quality as an explanatory variable to 
understand the effects of public spending in education and health; the general message being that 
the effectiveness of some specific policies depends on policymaking capabilities. 
 
4. Political Institutions, Intertemporal Cooperation, and the Quality of 
Policies 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the data construction and analysis of this paper follows from 
previous work by the authors on the study of the policymaking process using a particular lens. 
This lens focuses on the intertemporal nature of transactions.  This section briefly discusses the 
framework that has guided the research. More detailed accounts of the framework are presented 
in IDB (2006), Spiller and Tommasi (2007) and Stein et al. (2008). 
The policymaking process (PMP) can be understood as a process of bargains and 
exchanges (or transactions) among political actors. Some of these exchanges are consummated 
on the spot or instantaneously (spot transactions). In many other cases, current actions or 
resources (such as votes) are exchanged for promises of future actions or resources (they are 
intertemporal transactions). The type of transaction that political actors are able to engage in will 
depend on the possibilities provided by the institutional environment. Issues of credibility and 
the capacity to enforce political and policy agreements are crucial for political actors to be able 
to engage in intertemporal transactions.  
The behavior of political actors in the policymaking process, shaped by their preferences, 
incentives, and constraints, will in turn depend on the workings of political institutions (such as 
congress, the party system, or the judiciary) and on more basic institutional rules (such as 
  17electoral rules and constitutional rules) that determine the roles of each of the players, as well as 
the rules of engagement among them. 
We argue that valuable features of public policies depend on the ability of political actors 
to reach and enforce intertemporal agreements: that is, to cooperate.
13 In political environments 
that facilitate such agreements, public policies will tend to be of higher quality, less sensitive to 
political shocks, and more adaptable to changing economic and social conditions. In contrast, in 
settings that hinder cooperation, policies will be either too unstable (subject to political swings) 
or too inflexible (unable to adapt to socioeconomic shocks); they will tend to be poorly 
coordinated; and investments in state capabilities will tend to be lower.  That is, the value of the 
policy indexes we have constructed will depend on how cooperative the policymaking process is. 
The question then becomes, under what conditions is cooperation more likely? Drawing 
on intuitions from game theory, it can be argued that cooperative outcomes are more likely if: 
 
•  There are good “aggregation technologies” so that the numbers of actors with direct 
impact on the policy-making game is relatively small. 
•  There are well-institutionalized arenas for political exchange. 
•  Key actors have long time horizons. 
•  There are credible enforcement technologies, such as an independent judiciary or a 
strong bureaucracy, to which certain public policies can be delegated.
14  
 
These conditions are associated with some characteristics of key players and arenas such 
as congress, the party system, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy. For example, the political 
regime, the electoral system, the organization of Congress, the geographical organization of 
government, and the structure of the Judiciary may affect the number of agents. Also, the 
                                                 
13 The ingredients of our framework are not new. It builds upon previous contributions such as Alesina (1988), 
Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000), Dixit (2003), and de Figueiredo (2002).  The conceptualization of policymaking as 
intertemporal exchanges draws from a long tradition in transaction cost economics, which has been applied to the 
political arena by North (1990), Dixit (1996), and Levy and Spiller (1994). 
14 These conditions can not be considered in isolation and their impact will depend on the full set of conditions—the 
“general equilibrium.” For example, the role of the number of actors may depend on their horizon, and so forth. If 
horizons are short, a higher number of players may act to prevent policy change as predicted in the veto player 
theory. If horizons are long, a higher number of players may not necessarily generate the same results.  See 
Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi (2008) and  the next section.  
  18electoral system, term limits, reelection constraints, and the organization of parties may affect the 
term horizon of agents.
15 
Consequently, in this framework, the political institutions of a country, along with 
cultural norms and certain paths of previous behavior, affect the features of cooperation and 
more generally, the policymaking process. Those processes in which cooperation is possible will 
generate better features of policies. For example, countries in which cooperation is possible will 
have policies that are more stable, more adaptable, better coordinated, and so on. 
 
4.1 Institutional Variables 
 
This subsection presents some indicators of the workings of political institutions that, according 
to our framework, are likely to affect the probability of reaching cooperative agreements 
(aggregation technologies, arenas for exchange, time horizons, enforcement technologies, etc.) 
and hence the qualities of public policies.  We also present some other institutional variables 
considered in the literature.  The next subsection relates these institutional variables to the 
qualities of public policies. 
 
4.1.1 Capabilities of Congress 
 
Legislatures are critical to the functioning of democracy and act as an important arena for 
discussing and negotiating policy.  A legislature made of up professional legislators, with 
technical capabilities for discussing and overseeing policies, and adequate organizational 
structures, can facilitate the development of relatively consensual and consistent policies over 
time. 
  To measure the capabilities of legislatures, we used the average of two data sources, 
including the effectiveness of lawmaking bodies (from the GCR) and the population’s 
confidence in parliament (from the World Values Survey). 
 
4.1.2 Judicial Independence 
 
The judiciary is a key element of a well-functioning political system, as it is responsible for the 
enforcement of political and policy decisions, as reflected in constitutions and laws. A judiciary 
that effectively plays its role may contribute to better public policy outcomes, such as enhanced 
                                                 
15 Scartascini (2007) develops the links between the institutional variables traditionally utilized in the literature and 
the features of cooperation. 
  19policy stability, and policy implementation and enforcement.  If the judiciary is not independent 
of the other branches of government, it may not be effective in adhering to its role.  
This variable has been constructed from three different sources—GCR, BTI, and the 
Fraser Index—that attempt to measure the same phenomenon: whether the judiciary is subject to 
interference by the government or other political actors. 
 
4.1.3 Civil Service 
 
An effective and capable bureaucracy is likely to improve the quality of implementation of 
public policies, as well as their coordination across ministries. The competence and 
independence of the bureaucracy may decrease the likelihood that policy will be prone to 
politicization and political opportunism, and could increase policy adaptability to changing 
circumstances by relying on technical expertise.  
Our database includes an index that measures the degree of professionalism in the civil 
service, whether recruitment is based on merit, the level of the bureaucracy’s functional capacity 
and performance, and its efficiency (data sources include the State Capacity Survey and the 
International Country Risk Guide’s “Bureaucracy Quality” rating). 
 
4.1.4 Party Institutionalization  
 
The structure and organization of political parties and party systems can have an important 
influence on the policymaking process, both by playing a direct role and through interactions 
with other institutions.  Political parties can influence policy debates, affect executive-legislative 
relations, enhance or constrict the possibilities for coordination in congress, or manage the 
incentives of politicians at both the national and local level.  Institutionalized party systems 
could additionally serve as facilitators of intertemporal policy compromise.
16 
The Party System Institutionalization Index is comprised of five variables, which 
measure the extent to which there is a stable, moderate and socially rooted party system that can 
articulate and aggregate societal interests (from the BTI); the level of confidence in political 
parties (from the World Values Survey and various Barometers); vote volatility; the age of 
parties; and the fairness of elections.  
 
                                                 
16 In our previous work within Latin America we have found that institutionalized party systems, if programmatic, 
tend to correlate with high-quality policies (Stein and Tommasi, 2007). 
  204.1.5 Cabinet Stability 
 
Cabinet ministers in many countries play key roles in various stages of the policy process. The 
strength and organizational abilities of cabinets can have important effects on the outcomes of 
public policy. For example, a certain degree of cabinet stability is likely to be necessary to 
promote longer-term policies and allow ministers to see programs and policy implementation 
through to completion. Frequent turnover of cabinet ministers may foster the short-term 
orientation of policy and frequent policy changes, as well as a reduction in the effective 
coordination between the ministers and the bureaucratic institutions they may oversee. We 
employed a number of variables that describe the state of cabinets, including the number of 
cabinet changes in a year from the Cross National Time Series database.  
 
4.1.6 Other Variables 
 
The variables listed above are natural proxies for some facilitators of intertemporal cooperation.  
In our analysis we have included other institutional variables which come from alternative 
frameworks (such as veto player theories, particularly Tsebelis, 2002), as well as some of the 
institutional rules used more broadly in the literature on political institutions and policy. 
One important variable for the very prominent veto players approach is the variable 
Executive Constraints.  These variables refer to the number of veto players and checks in the 
political system. The number of veto players in a system—those individuals or organizations 
who play a significant role by either blocking a policy, or whose consent is needed to pass a 
proposal—can affect policy stability and adaptability.  The presence of more veto players in a 
system signifies that it may be more difficult to change policy, thus increasing policy stability.  
At the same time, higher numbers of veto gates to pass through may indicate that policy may be 
more difficult to change, leading to decreased policy adaptability. We employed a number of 
variables that attempt to measure the number of veto players or institutional checks within 
various political systems. They come from various datasets such as Henisz’s “polcon” variables 
and the Database of Political Institutions from the World Bank. 
Other variables that we consider include Parliamentarism, Federalism, whether the 
electoral system is proportional, and whether the executive is elected. These variables are not 
easily mapped directly into this project’s motivating framework. As will be shown below, they 
are usually not related to the policy variables. Some, however, such as political regime, seem to 
  21matter. Left for future exploration is whether some institutional variables may have a direct 
impact on the policy variables (e.g., whether parliamentarism embodies certain characteristics 
facilitating intertemporal cooperation that are not captured otherwise) or whether they may proxy 
for other characteristics of the polity (e.g., in parliamentary countries, party systems are usually 
more institutionalized and congress tend to be more capable, hence, parliamentarism may proxy 




4.2 Relating Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes 
 
In this section we present a brief summary of ongoing work (Machado et al., 2009) relating the 
institutional variables listed above to the indicators of policy characteristics presented earlier.  
The framework used to construct these variables generates a number of predictions relating some 
institutional conditions likely to foster intertemporal cooperation to the features of policies 
captured by our policy indexes. As shown in Table 4, our expectations are borne out by the data. 
The “intertemporal” institutional variables are often positively and significantly correlated with 
policy features, (a partial exception being the durability of cabinets). This suggests these 
desirable policy features might indeed be a consequence of good well-functioning policymaking 




                                                 
17 Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005), another interesting inquiry into the role of alternative political institutions 
on some governance outcomes, shares the same broad set of concerns as this agenda.  The authors propose a 
reduced-form characteristic of political systems called centripetalism as the most favorable to good governance.  In 
their view, parliamentarism favors centripetalism, and hence good outcomes. 
18 When we look at basic institutional rules such as the electoral system or the government system we fail to observe 
significant effects. 
  22Table 4. Policy and Institutional Variables Partial Correlation Matrix 
 
  





























































































   ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1. Second row of each variable indicates the number of observations. 
 
Similar results are obtained when we look at the multivariate interaction of these 
variables. We focus this brief analysis on the Policy Index.
19 Looking at the three specifications 
in Table 5, where each includes a particular set of variables, we see that both our institutional 
quality variables and other polity characteristics have a significant effect on the overall quality of 
policies. The one exception is our measure of party institutionalization, where we fail to reject 
the hypothesis that its effect is null for the policy index. It is significant, however, for some of 
the individual indexes.  
Plain institutional rules have no discernible effect either.  When we group all these 
variables into a single specification, though, only the previously significant institutional quality 
variables remain positive and significantly associated with the Policy Index. The results, which 
are explored further in Machado et al. (2009) are encouraging regarding the framework. 
Particularly, the institutional variables related to intertemporal cooperation are significant to 
explain the policy index (and the individual indexes which are no reported here) but the 
institutional variables traditionally used in the literature to explain economic outcomes seem not 
to matter that much, at least not directly. 
 
                                                 
19 See Machado et al. (2009) for a more complete analysis, looking at each of our dependent variables in detail. 
  23Table 5.  Regression Results: Policy Index and Institutional Variables 
 
   Policy Index 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Congress Capabilities  0.29*** 





(0.054)    0.32*** 
(0.07) 
Bureaucracy Quality  0.18*** 





(0.065)    0.04 
(0.09) 
Cabinet Stability  0.02 
(0.123)    0.11 
(0.15) 























Ln(GDPpc)  Yes Yes  Yes 
Region  Yes Yes  Yes 
Legal Origin  Yes Yes  Yes 
 Adjusted R2  0.88 0.69  0.87 
 N  113 122  105 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 




  245. Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions, and Policy Adaptability 
 
One of the most prominent theoretical strands in comparative politics today is the veto player 
theory developed and summarized by Tsebelis (2002).
20  It is an approach that attempts to 
provide a synthetic characterization of political systems in terms of their impact on the easiness 
or difficulty of implementing policy change. 
Veto players are political actors whose agreement is necessary to change policy. One of 
the main predictions of veto players’ theory is that polities with a higher number of veto players 
are less likely to change their policies. This is good for sustaining policy commitments, but bad 
for adapting to changing circumstances or to policy failures. 
Using the policy variables constructed in this paper, and the framework summarized in 
the previous section, Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2008) challenges this prediction from the 
veto player approach.  We postulate that polities more able to sustain policies over time will not 
necessarily will be less able to adjust policies when necessary, and our separate notions of 
stability and adaptability attempt to capture these two distinct concepts.  Furthermore, in our 
perspective, polities that are better able to cooperate over time might be able to achieve more of 
both desirable policy qualities in such a way that we could find these two variables positively 
correlated in a cross section of countries. If policymaking takes place over time with actors 
interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once 
(and under some conditions a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal 
cooperation.) Figure 2 shows that stability and adaptability are indeed positively correlated 
across countries, even after controlling for other factors likely to affect both policy 
characteristics. 
 
                                                 
20 In Scartascini, Stein and Tommasi (2008) we complement the theory as presented in Tsebelis with the work of 
Cox and McCubbins (2001) for presidential democracies. This distinction is important, as some of the predictions of 
the theory that we analyze come from this strand of literature. 






















































Furthermore, in that paper we find that a higher number of veto players indeed increases 
both stability and adaptability, and that both variables are better explained by institutional 
variables attempting to capture intertemporal cooperation than by variables that measure the 
number of veto players (see Table 6). 
 
 
  26Table 6. Regression Results: The Role of Veto Players 
 
  Stability Adaptability 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Vetoes (polcon V)  0.978*** -0.135  1.710*** 0.0437 
  (0.176) (0.229)  (0.207) (0.354) 
Party 
institutionalization   0.121*    0.260** 
   (0.0686)    (0.120) 
Judicial 
independence   0.293***   0.469*** 
   (0.0684)    (0.114) 
Cabinet changes   0.106   0.205 
   (0.163)   (0.277) 
Ln(GDPpc)   Yes   Yes 
Region   Yes   Yes 
Legal Origin   Yes   Yes 
R-squared  0.19 0.695  0.31 0.681 
Observations  126 99  145  103 
 




6.  Effective Policy Outcomes Depend on the Quality of Policies:  
     The Cases of Education and Health 
 
So far, we have considered the policy features in their role as dependent variables. However, 
some of the features captured by our indexes may also help explain certain political and 
economic outcomes. One possibility we explore here is that the indexes may help to explain 
improvements in development outcomes.  For that purpose, we look at the impact of the policy 
indexes on some components of the Human Development Index. 
  The Human Development Index (HDI) is composed of three aspects of a country’s 
development: health, education and wealth. As shown above, our policy indexes are positively 
associated with GDP per capita growth and also positively associated with changes in the UNDP 
index of development (HDI). Now we want to explain what matters for a country for improving 
their scores on the other two components of the HDI: health, measured in terms of life 
expectancy, and education, measured as a combination of adult literacy rate and enrollment rates 
at all educational levels. Basically, we want to check the relationship between quantity of inputs 
and quality of outcomes given the overall features of policies in the countries. Do countries that 
  27spend more on health and education perform better irrespective of their institutions? Or does the 
quality of the policies they produce also play a significant role?   
Table 7 shows the results of running a simple OLS specification explaining a country’s 
change in the health and education index between 1995 and 2005 based on our Policy and 
Public-Regardedness indexes, and expenditures on health and education (measured as the log of 
average expenditures between 1998 and 2005
21) and, in some specifications, an interaction effect 
between the two independent variables. 
 
Table 7. Health and Education Outcomes and the Policy Index 
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Policy Index  0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
0.12     0.17*** 
(0.04) 
1.63*** 
(0.45)    
Public-Regardedness     0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.06 











(0.03)      











  0.02 




      -0.05*** 




    -0.09 




        -0.05*** 
(0.02) 
Adjusted R2  0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.34 0.26 0.31 
Obs  137 137 132 132 118 118 114 114 
 
Note: Significant at 1% level (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
The dependent variables are measures as changes in the health and education index calculated by the UNDP 
between the years 1992 and 2005, weighted by possible improvement. 
 
Considering health first, we see that while our policy index fails to achieve significance, 
our measure of public-regardedness seems significant. One possible explanation is the following: 
improving life expectancy requires not only having a good set of policies but targeting them to 
the worse-off. In addition, following our question regarding expenditures and policies, it is 
interesting to consider the effect of the quality of the policies interacted with that of 
                                                 
21 Expenditures are measured in constant dollars of 2000. The source is the World Development Indicators compiled 
by the World Bank.  
  28expenditures. The findings are plotted in Figure 3. While the effect of the policy index is not 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level for any level of expenditures (left panel), 
expenditures on health are significant only for higher values of the policy index (right panel). In 
other words, if a country’s policy environment is not good, spending more on health has no clear 
effect on improving life expectancy. Conversely it suggests that as countries develop a good 
policy environment (i.e., they move along the x axis on the right panel), they tend to benefit 
more from a given amount spent (the effect of health expenditures is positive and significant).  
 
 




Turning now to changes in a country’s education index, we notice that both the general 
policy environment and the degree to which policies are public regarding matter significantly. 
Also how much a country invests in education plays a significant role. Here the interaction 
between the two explanatory variables seems to add to the models explanatory power in an 
interesting way.  
As shown in Figure 4, if a country does not spend much on education relative to others 
(maybe because it is poor), the quality of its policies matters considerably. For a same small 
amount spent, countries whose policies have better features reap greater benefits in terms of 
lower literacy and higher enrollment rates (left panel).  However, this effect is not the same for 
every level of expenditure. Those countries that are able to spend more (which means moving to 
  29the right in the x axis of the left panel) get a very similar result regardless of the quality of their 
policies. The evidence seems to indicate that in education countries can substitute money for 
policy quality. The right panel of the figure shows similar evidence. Countries displaying low 
quality of policies tend to show higher improvements if they invest higher amounts. However, 
once they achieved average to high levels of policy quality, the amount spent has no discernible 
effect on changes in outcome. 
 
Figure 4. Effects of Policy Index and Education Expenditures on Education Improvement 

















































































































This simple exercise suggests that the policy environment does indeed matter. However, 
it also suggests that it matters differently depending on the issue at hand. Despite the differences, 
though, a common underlying message seems to come out clearly, corroborating what other 
researchers have also found. That countries may achieve important gains by investing on their 
institutions and the quality of policies they produce (Killick, 1995). In some cases, it may be 




  306. Conclusions 
 
The paper has introduced a number of cross-national measures of various properties or qualities 
of public policies. These variables can have multiple uses. Here, we have suggested some 
applications.  First, we have shown that certain characteristics of the policymaking environment, 
that in our previous work we have related to the capacity of generating intertemporal agreements, 
tend to generate better policy features. For example, we show that countries with higher congress 
capabilities, judicial independence, and bureaucratic quality tend to fare better in terms of their 
policy index. 
Second, we have summarized related work using two of the policy variables that 
challenges some of the results of the veto player literature. Basically, we find that there is not 
necessarily a trade-off between stability and adaptability and that a higher number of veto 
players reduce policy adaptability. We argue that a higher number of vetoes may facilitate 
intertemporal cooperation, and intertemporal cooperation may give countries the ability of 
circumvent the trade-off.    
Third, we are also attempting to use these proxies for state capacity as control variables 
for explaining the impact of public spending on a number of social areas.  These preliminary 
results suggest that the policy environment does indeed matter. However, it also suggests that it 
matters differently depending on the issue at hand (in our example, education and health). 
While we believe these preliminary results are interesting in their own right, if for no 
other reason than to foster discussion on these subjects, we hope that the dataset itself will 
stimulate scholars to utilize it in their analysis of political institutions, public policies, and 
development outcomes. 
 
  31Appendix A 
 
Index Construction Method and Robustness Checks 
 
As previously mentioned, the variables we have introduced have been constructed using 
available data. As in some cases data were not available for every country, we have followed the 
particular method that we describe in this section.  In this section we also try to tackle two issues 
related to the construction of the variables: the perils of using aggregate indicators and the fact 
that they have been constructed using (mostly) subjective data.   
 
i. Construction Methodology 
 
All of the indexes created for this project were calculated based on the average of their respective 
components. Before calculating this average, we rescaled some variables so that their values 
would go from low to high levels of the measure of interest. Observations for which data were 
missing, but for which data on at least one component of an index were available, had data 
entered according to the following procedure: 
 
1.  Create new variables, one for each component of the index, with values corresponding to 
how many standard deviations away from the mean (of the given component) each 
observation is. 
2.  Input the average standard deviation (calculated over the components of the index) to the 
missing data. 
3.  Transform these new variables back to the original scale. 
4.  Rescale all components (now with inputted values in place of missing ones) to range 
between 0 and 4. 
 
This method was chosen so that inputted data would take the position of each country 
vis-à-vis other countries in the distributions of component variables into account.   
Given the large number of countries covered and the wide variance of data availability, 
we created measures of the “quality” of each index recording the number of component variables 
available for each observation. In all of the regressions presented here, where one of our indexes 
is the dependent variable, we estimate “weighted least squares” models. That is, we weight each 




ii. Robustness Checks 
 
In order to ensure that the new data we collected are reliable, we ran a number of checks to 
examine whether we were measuring the desired components of public policies and institutions. 
First, we correlated the new data with the data collected from the State Capabilities survey 
conducted for IDB (2006).  This survey questioned more than 150 experts in 18 Latin American 
countries, including public policy analysts, economists, political scientists, and former 
policymakers (including a few former presidents), regarding the capabilities of the State in a 
number of dimensions identified as crucial by Weaver and Rockman (1993). The results of the 
correlations, which are in general positive, significant, and high, suggests that the new data 
collected reflect previous exercises conducted on experts’ opinions of the state of public policy, 
at least for Latin America and the Caribbean.   
We also checked the data against cyclicality data from Braun and di Gresia (2002). We 
found a negative and significant relationship between our policy adaptability variables and the 
Braun and di Gresia’s cyclicality data, which shows that the adaptability variable is effectively 
capturing government policy responses to changes, in this case, economic conditions. 
 
iii. Addressing the Perils of Aggregate Indicators 
 
The “use and abuse” of governance indicators has garnered enough attention in some circles to 
merit a discussion here of our use of particular indicators and our arguments in favor of them.  
Critics of governance indicators such as the World Bank’s Governance Indicators argue that the 
design of the indicators—especially qualitative indicators—leaves them vulnerable to 
measurement error, is insufficiently transparent, creates an arbitrary scale that does not allow for 
monitoring of changes in levels of governance over time, and allows for sample bias (Arndt and 
Oman 2006; Glaeser et al., 2004).  In order to avoid bias, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue for using 
“hard,” objective measures of institutions, as these measures are not influenced by the outcomes 
they are meant to predict.  Examples of “hard” measures include variables on electoral system 
design and constitutional elements.  However, Woodruff (2007 mimeo) argues that relying on 
                                                 
22 Weights are calculated using the aweight command in stata. 
  33hard measures of constitutional design fails to capture the difference between intended and   
actual outcomes., as there often discrepancies en differences between de jure laws and rules 
mandated in institutions and de facto conditions.  “Soft” measurements of institutions tend to 
capture more subjective features of the outcome of institutional design and implementation, such 
as the level of judicial independence, the capacity of institutions such as the legislature or the 
bureaucracy, or the institutionalization of political parties. These measures are often available 
from organizations such as the Global Competitiveness Report or Bertelsmann Transformation 
index. The data are often based on the opinion of in-country experts, who then submit their 
ratings to a panel of members that checks and verifies the data and subsequently rates the 
countries.
23  “In-between” measures are “harder” than impressionistic measures but “softer” than 
the constitutional measures. An example of “in-between” measures include the Polity IV 
measure of executive constraints, which looks at the various veto players in a government, as 
well as the ideological alignment among players, to measure the level of constraints upon the 
executive branch. 
Given the large number of countries and the fact that most data sources have been 
collected for a limited number of years, in our dataset we use averages of data, ranging from 
[either 1980 to the present or] 1990 to the present, conditional on the availability of data. Most 
qualitative, or “soft” measurements of public policy outcomes and institutions, such as those that 
survey expert opinion, start in the 1990s.  Averaging the values of the indicators does not allow 
us to see changes in policy outcomes over time; however, it may allow us to ensure that the 
“soft” measures of institutional capacity are not influenced by the economic conditions of the 
country. Glaeser et. al (2004) and Arndt and Oman (2006) criticize the World Bank Governance 
Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2004) in part for their belief that experts who 
provide data for some of the sources may be influenced by financial or political crises and by 
perceived changes or long-term trends in a country’s economic performance. Kaufmann, Kray 
and Mastruzzi (2004) reply that this “halo effect,” which may be thought of as a measurement 
error, does not withstand statistical models they developed to test for the impact on the 
governance indicators (p. 12).  Glaeser et al. (2004) also note that variables, such as those 
                                                 
23 Interested readers may view an example of how some organizations produce their data; an example is the BTI. 
Their methodology is available at 
:http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/BTI_2006_Brosch_re_GB.pdf 
 
  34available in Henisz (2006) and the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2006), which measure 
veto players and preferences, are in essence recording election outcomes instead of institutions.  
In any event, by averaging the data available for the “softer” measurements of 
institutions, we may be ensuring that inflated or deflated scores on certain measures are 
smoothed out over time and provide a better picture of the state of institutions and related public 
policy outcomes.  
  35Appendix B 
 
Country Ranking by Policy Index* 
 
country  Policy 
Index  Adapt ImplementCoordinate Efficiency Public 
Regard  Stab 
Denmark  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Germany  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Netherlands  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Ireland  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Switzerland  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Australia  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Singapore  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Hong Kong, China  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Norway  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
New Zealand  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
United Kingdom  high  high  high  high  high  high  high 
Iceland  high    high    high  high  high 
Austria  high    high    high  high  high 
Belgium  high    high   mid-hi  high  high 
Slovenia  high  high  high  high  high  high  mid-hi 
Oman  high  high  high  high  high  high  mid-hi 
Spain  high  high  high  high  high  high  mid-hi 
Cuba  high  high  high  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi 
Hungary  high  high  high  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi 
Mauritius  high  high  high  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi 
Israel  high  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high 
Sweden  high  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high 
Canada  high  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high 
Japan  high  high  high  high  mid-low  high  mid-hi 
Chile  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high  high 
Tunisia  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high  high 
Botswana  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high  mid-hi 
Taiwan  high  high  high  mid-hi  high  high  mid-low 
France  high  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi high  mid-hi 
Korea, Rep.  high  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
Estonia  high  mid-hi  high  high  high  high  high 
United States  high  mid-hi  high  high  high  high  high 
Finland  high  mid-hi  high  high  high  high  high 
Portugal  high  mid-hi mid-hi high  high  high  high 
Bahrain  high  mid-hi mid-hi high  high  high  mid-hi 
South Africa  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi high  high  mid-hi 
Malaysia  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi high  mid-hi  high 
United Arab Emirates  high  mid-low mid-hi    high  high  high 
Namibia mid-hi  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
Lithuania mid-hi  high  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-low 
Brazil mid-hi  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
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Greece mid-hi  high  mid-hi  low  high  mid-hi mid-hi 
Slovak Republic  mid-hi  high  mid-hi   high  mid-hi  low 
Latvia mid-hi  high  mid-hi   high  mid-hi  low 
Uruguay mid-hi  high  mid-hi   mid-hi high  mid-hi 
China mid-hi  high  mid-low  high  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
Ghana mid-hi  mid-hi  high  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi  low 
Rwanda mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  high  mid-hi  mid-low  high 
Iraq mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  high  low low  
Thailand  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi high  mid-hi mid-hi 
Jordan  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi high  mid-hi 
India  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
Mexico  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-low 
Romania  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-low 
Kuwait  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-low 
Poland  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-low  mid-low 
Uganda  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi low  mid-low 
Mozambique  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-low  mid-low mid-hi 
Senegal mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  high  mid-hi mid-hi 
Czech Republic  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
Colombia mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low 
Costa Rica  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low low  mid-hi  mid-hi 
Tanzania mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-hi  low  mid-hi mid-hi low 
Armenia  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi   mid-hi low   
Jamaica  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi   mid-low  mid-low  mid-low 
Italy mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi mid-hi 
Turkey mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low 
Sri Lanka  mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low 
Vietnam mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  high 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi    mid-low 
El Salvador  mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  low  mid-hi mid-hi mid-low 
Cote d'Ivoire  mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  low  mid-hi  low  mid-low 
Morocco mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low 
Kazakhstan mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi 
Gambia, The  mid-hi  low  mid-hi  mid-low  mid-hi mid-hi  
Trinidad and Tobago  mid-hi    mid-low   mid-hi  mid-low  high 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  mid-low  high  high  low  high    low 
Lao PDR  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  
Burkina Faso  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  low 
Mongolia  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low   
Peru  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low 
Macedonia, FYR  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low   mid-low  mid-low  
Serbia and Montenegro  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low   mid-low  mid-low  
Argentina  mid-low mid-hi  low  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-low 
Zambia  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low 
Gabon  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  low  mid-low  mid-low 
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Malawi  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  low low mid-low mid-hi 
Indonesia  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low  low 
Benin  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low 
Panama  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  mid-low  low 
Uzbekistan  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  low low mid-hi 
Bulgaria  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi  mid-low 
Georgia  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low mid-hi  low   
Ukraine  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-hi  low 
Mali  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-hi mid-hi mid-low 
Madagascar  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-low  mid-low  low 
Libya  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low   mid-low  low   
Saudi Arabia  mid-low  mid-low  low  high  mid-low mid-hi  mid-hi 
Tajikistan  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-hi mid-hi mid-low  
Philippines  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-low 
Syria  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-low  low  mid-hi  low 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  mid-low  mid-low  low low mid-low  mid-low  
Belarus  mid-low  low  mid-hi  high  mid-low  mid-low  
Kenya  mid-low  low  mid-low mid-hi  mid-low  low low 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  mid-low  low  mid-low mid-hi  low  mid-low  low 
Eritrea  mid-low  low  mid-low mid-hi  low  mid-low  
Ethiopia  mid-low  low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low 
Guinea-Bissau  mid-low  low low high    mid-hi 
Nepal  mid-low  low low mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  high 
Pakistan  mid-low  low low mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low 
Albania  mid-low  low low low mid-low  low  high 
Lesotho  mid-low     mid-low mid-hi   
Swaziland  mid-low      mid-low  
Bangladesh  low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low low mid-low 
Bolivia  low  mid-low  mid-low  mid-low  low low low 
Russia  low  mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-low  low low 
Azerbaijan  low  mid-low  mid-low  low low mid-low   
Honduras  low  mid-low  mid-low  low low low low 
Dominican Republic  low  mid-low  low  mid-low  low  mid-low  low 
Ecuador  low  mid-low  low  mid-low  low low low 
Afghanistan  low  mid-low  low low mid-low  low   
Guinea  low  mid-low  low low mid-low   mid-low 
Nigeria  low  mid-low  low low low low mid-low 
Cambodia  low  mid-low  low low low low low 
Mauritania  low low mid-hi  mid-low  low  high  low 
Papua New Guinea  low low mid-hi low  low low low 
Algeria  low low mid-low  mid-low  low  mid-hi  low 
Niger  low low mid-low  low  mid-low low  mid-low 
Sudan  low low mid-low  low low low  
Myanmar  low low low high  low low low 
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Kyrgyz Republic  low low low mid-hi  low low  
Nicaragua  low low low mid-low  mid-low  low low 
Burundi  low low low mid-low  low  mid-low  mid-low 
Venezuela  low low low mid-low  low  mid-low  low 
Lebanon  low low low low mid-hi  mid-low  low 
Yemen, Rep.  low low low low mid-low  mid-low  low 
Sierra Leone  low low low low mid-low  low  high 
Moldova  low low low low low mid-low  
Haiti  low low low low low low mid-hi 
Chad  low low low low low low mid-low 
Cameroon  low low low low low low mid-low 
Croatia  low low low   mid-low  mid-low  low 
Togo  low low low   low   high 
Central African Republic  low low low   low   mid-hi 
Paraguay  low low low low low low low 
Guatemala  low low low low low low low 
Somalia  low low low low low low  
Liberia  low low low low low low  
Angola  low low low low low low  
Zimbabwe  low low low   low low low 
Turkmenistan  low low low   low low  
 
*Note: The categories in the table correspond to quartile distributions. The quartiles for each policy 
variable were calculated based on its own distribution of values. Thus countries scoring the same value in 
two policies might well end up in different quartiles if different policies displayed different distributions 
(e.g., one policy distribution is skewed towards lower values and the other towards higher values). 
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